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New means and modes ofproviding health care are currently under
development in this country. One new form, the Preferred Provider Or-
ganization (PPO), promises to ensure the continuing availability of cost
efficient, high quality health care to the health care consumer. This
form allows subscribers the advantages of standardization and efficiency
found in other plans but permits a larger degree offlexibility in choosing
providers. A significant pitfall to the viability of PPOs is their potential
to violate federal antitrust laws. In this Article Mr. Classen examines
the antitrust ramifications of PPOs. The discussion includes identifica-
tion of the aspects of PPOs which cause the greatest antitrust concerns,
examination of the pertinent antitrust law, and illumination of possible
antitrust exceptions available to PPOs. The Article concludes that PPOs
remain a viable health care vehicle despite their potential antitrust
problems.
In response to rising expenditures for health care1 and the increasing
number of practicing physicians, 2 new means of providing health care services
constantly are being developed in this country. Many of these "alternative deliv-
ery systems" 3 offer unlimited, cost-efficient, high-quality health care for one pre-
t Associate General Counsel, International Mobile Machines Corp., Philadelphia, Pa.; B.A.
Trinity College 1982; J.D. The Catholic University of America 1985. The author wishes to express
his sincere gratitude to Patrick E. Quinlan, Esq., Allyn L. Simon, Joanne L. Anderson, Charles
Diliman and the law firm of Weinberg and Green for their help in producing this Article.
1. The following table summarizes the rise in national health expenditures in the United States
since 1970:
Total Per Capita % of Gross
Year (bil. dol.) (dol.) National Product
1970 75.0 349 7.4
1975 132.7 590 8.3
1980 248.1 1,054 9.1
1983 357.2 1,473 10.5
1984 390.2 1,595 10.3
1985 425.0 1,721 10.7
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1987, at 84 (107th ed. 1987).
2. The number of medical degrees granted each year continues to increase. In 1960, 7,032
medical degrees were conferred; 8,314 in 1970; 12,447 in 1975; 14,902 in 1980; and 15,814 in 1982.
Id. at 148.
3. "Alternative delivery system" is a generic term referring to the myriad of entities providing
health care in the United States that are alternatives to traditional insurance plans such as Blue
Cross/Blue Shield. Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), Preferred Provider Organizations
(PPOs), and Independent Practice Associations (IPAs) are the most well-known. See Classen, A
Supermarket of Health Programs, BALTIMORE BUS. J., July 7-13, 1986, at 14.
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paid price. Nonetheless, many individuals are reluctant to join them because of
the restrictions imposed upon subscribers.4 Preferred Provider Organizations
(PPOs) have grown quickly in recent years in response to public concern,5 by
providing high-quality health care without the drawbacks of other alternative
delivery systems.
6
The rapid increase in the popularity of PPOs has caught many regulatory
agencies by surprise; consequently, regulation of PPOs is not uniform. The ma-
jor challenge to the continued development of PPOs is the close scrutiny they
will receive under the existing federal antitrust laws, 7 despite recognition that
they will play a significant role in the delivery of cost-efficient health care in the
future.8
Aspects of PPOs that are of great concern to the United States Department
of Justice include communications among physicians about prices, fees, and
other economic terms; the exclusion of certain physicians from the PPO panel;
exclusive contracts with physicians; limitations on the types of services offered
by particular physicians regarding the geographic areas or patients they can
serve; and peer review of prices.
This Article investigates whether provider-based PPOs are a viable alterna-
tive for the continued delivery of health care under the present federal antitrust
laws. It first reviews the major forms of PPOs and the relevant sections of the
federal antitrust laws that affect them. The Article then explores previous deci-
sions in this area and discusses the current antitrust concerns presented by
PPOs. Finally, the Article posits that despite present federal antitrust policies,
provider-based PPOs remain a viable alternative for providing high-quality,
cost-efficient health care in the United States.
4. Health Maintanence Organizations (HMOs), for example, restrict subscribers to using a set
panel of physicians, often excluding the subscribers' personal physicians. Furthermore, subscribers
often may not receive health care outside their geographic area. Id. Providers such as hospitals and
physicians often are reluctant to join HMOs because they bear a portion of the risk of over-utiliza-
tion, id., as well as having to meet substantial regulatory requirements. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to
300e-17 (1982).
5. There are approximately 250 PPOs in the United States today, compared to a mere handful
a few years ago. Two-thirds of these have been in operation for only about one year. Stromberg,
PPOs and Regulation, HEALTHSPAN, Oct. 1986, at 2. One health care executive has projected that
50% of the medically insured population of the United States will be enrolled in a PPO by the year
2000. WASH. AcTIONS ON HEALTH, Jan. 5, 1987, at 8.
6. PPOs do not restrict subscribers to a limited number of providers. Furthermore, physicians
are not required to bear a portion of the risk. They are paid on a fee-for-service basis and thus do not
have the incentive to overly restrict health care services. See Tichon, PPOs: Definition and Back-
ground, in ATTORNEYS AND PHYSICIANS EXAMINE PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS 4 (J.
Waxman ed. 1984).
7. See infra notes 28-52 and accompanying text. Legislation previously has been proposed in
Congress to weaken state statutes restricting the development of PPOs. See H.R. 733, 99th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1985); H.R. 2956, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
8. See J. McGrath, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice, Remarks at the 33d
American Bar Association Antitrust Spring Meeting (Mar. 22, 1985) [hereinafter McGrath Re-
marks]; PPS Dissolves After Justice Threatens to File § 1 Action, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
721 (Oct. 18, 1984); FTC Advisory Opinion to Health Care Management Associates, 3 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 22,036, at 22,641 (June 8, 1983).
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I. PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS
A PPO is a health care financing and delivery program that provides finan-
cial incentives to consumers to utilize certain "preferred" providers. 9 A PPO
typically offers health care services through independent providers, such as phy-
sicians or hospitals, to third party payors, such as insurance companies and em-
ployers, at discounted rates in return for the expedited payment of claims. The
PPO carefully selects the providers that deliver the services to ensure that a wide
range of quality services is available. 10 In essence, the PPO contracts with health
care providers to provide services at a discounted rate and with purchasers of
health care services to satisfy their health care needs.
PPOs contract with a panel of "preferred" providers comprised of physi-
cians, hospitals, or both. The ideal makeup of a "panel" includes a cross-section
of providers who will offer quality health care and a full range of services.
Although beneficiaries or subscribers of the PPO are given complete freedom to
choose their treating physician, 1I they are strongly encouraged to choose a "pre-
ferred" provider from the existing panel. This encouragement takes the form of
economic incentives such as no copayments, lower deductibles, and higher
coverage. 12
The PPO in turn negotiates a fee schedule with the individual physicians
who constitute the "preferred" provider panel. Member physicians usually dis-
count their fees or provide a maximum fee schedule. Physician fees can be es-
tablished on the basis of a relative value guide, 13 conversion factors, 14 or even
capitation. 15 Health care providers benefit through increased or guaranteed pa-
tient volume and the quick and efficient payment of claims. 16 The providers
forming the PPO do not take an insurance-type risk, market services, or collect
premiums. Instead, they negotiate their fees or rates with the payor, leaving the
payor to bear any financial risk.
The financial well-being of a PPO is contingent on many factors. To be
successful a PPO must have a wide geographic distribution of physicians, be
oriented to primary care, offer legitimate consumer savings, maximize physician
9. Alternatively, a PPO has been defined as "an entity that offers health care services through
providers who are otherwise independent to third partytpayors such as insurance companies and
employers, normally at discounted rates in return for expedited payment of claims." PRACTICING
LAW INSTITUTE, HEALTH CARE: LEGAL RESPONSES TO NEW ECONOMIC FORCES 272 (1985).
10. Providers for the "preferred" panel are carefully selected on the basis of objective criteria.
The PPO screens high-quality physicians, and generally selects a preferred panel on the basis of the
number of malpractice actions, board certification, submission to utilization review, see infra notes
17-18 and accompanying text, as well as cost consciousness, geographic location, and specialty
coverage.
11. Tichon, supra note 6, at 5.
12. Tichon, supra note 6, at 5.
13. Tichon, supra note 6, at 4-6; see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soe'y, 457 U.S.
332, 340-41 (1982) (defining relative value schedules).
14. Tichon, supra note 6, at 4-6; see also Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 340-41 (defining conversion
factors).
15. Tichon, supra note 6, at 4-6. Capitation is a "uniform per capita payment." WEBSTER'S
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 163 (1981).
16. Tichon, supra note 6, at 5-6.
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involvement, and ensure a solid relationship between the providers and purchas-
ers of the services offered. As in any business, financial success is directly related
to efficiency and productivity. To that end, PPOs attempt to increase efficiency
through a system of managerial oversight known as "utilization review."
Utilization review involves comprehensive review of all treatment decisions,
prior authorization of treatment before it is offered, referral authorization, and
second opinions.17 Furthermore, utilization review includes investigation of
other options such as same-day surgery and referrals to home health care. The
underlying theory of utilization review is that education, behavior modification,
and sanctions will eliminate the delivery of unnecessary health care.18
Although all PPOs have the same general characteristics, they exist in a
number of different forms. Among the most prevalent are entrepreneur or bro-
ker-based PPOs, payor-based PPOs, and provider-based PPOs. In addition, new
forms recently have been developed. 19
Entrepreneur or broker-based PPOs are perhaps the most common existing
form of PPOs. Under an entrepreneur structure, a claims administrator or in-
surance broker negotiates an agreement between the providers and the purchas-
ers. Upon receiving a commitment from a substantial number of providers, the
broker will market this "panel" to her clients and other purchasers of health
care services. She profits from the fee structure and administrative fees. The
broker is not associated with the providers or purchasers. This structure, unless
backed by an insurance company, is extremely risky for the providers, because
there is very little protection against payor insolvency or misconduct by those
administering the plan.
20
A second type of PPO is the payor-based PPO, which is usually organized
and controlled by an insurance company, employer, or union trust fund.21 Typ-
ically, these PPOs contract with hospitals and physicians to provide health care
services to the PPO's beneficiaries. The provider acts only as an employee of the
PPO serving on a contractual basis. The provider maintains his traditional "fee-
for-service" status but at a negotiated rate. The payor attempts to reduce its
health care expenditures by negotiating substantial discounts from the physi-
cians' usual fees in return for increased patient volume and the quick payment of
all claims. The physician, while charging a lower price, can increase his overall
income through the sheer volume of patients generated by the payor's many
17. Utilization review, which attempts to reduce costs by eliminating the delivery of unneces-
sary health care, has been the basis of at least one suit. See Wickline v. State, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661
(1986) (patient who was prematurely discharged because of a utilization review's decision to cease
health care payments subsequently had leg amputated as a result of his premature discharge), rev.
dismissed, 741 P.2d 613, 239 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1987).
18. Id. at 663.
19. One variant is an Exclusive Provider Organization, which limits subscribers to utilizing
only the "preferred" provider panel. Another is a Management Premium PPO, which provides for
risk sharing by purchasers and providers. Providers are still compensated on a fee-for-service basis,
but a portion of the fees are set aside and returned to purchasers if providers are unable to control
prices.
20. R. Lavine, Remarks at the Seventh Annual Institute on Medicare and Medicaid Payment





Provider-based PPOs, the focus of this Article, are typically organized by a
hospital, a network of hospitals, or a group of physicians in order to sell their
services to large purchasers of health care services or directly to beneficiaries.
2 3
Usually, a provider-based PPO is owned and operated by the hospital at which
the majority of the participating physicians practice. A number of recent PPOs,
however, have been organized by physician groups. 24 Typically, these physicians
join together to make themselves more competitive in the existing market. An-
other provider-based alternative is a joint venture between a hospital and a
group of physicians. 2
5
Provider-based PPOs, especially those that are sponsored by physicians, are
subject to great scrutiny under existing federal antitrust laws.26 Often the temp-
tation for physicians to communicate about prices, fees, and other economic
terms is simply too great. To withstand antitrust challenges, a provider-based
PPO must gain its financial benefits by increasing the members' competitiveness
in the existing market and not by eliminating or discouraging competition from
other physicians.
27
II. RELEVANT FEDERAL ANTITRUST STATUTES
Because of their potential for fostering anti-competitive behavior, PPOs are
closely scrutinized under a number of federal antitrust laws. Federal legislation
is particularly important because PPOs until recently have been regulated only
lightly, if at all, by state agencies.
28
A. The Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 29 prohibits "[e]very contract, com-
bination ...or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . . ' The
22. Id.
23. Id. One example of a large purchaser is the United States Department of Defense. "The
Pentagon's massive plan to reform its health care system for 6.2 million dependents and retirees
would result in three giant, at-risk preferred provider organizations (PPOs) ...." Defense Depart-
ment Plan Opens Vast PPO Opportunity, WASH. AcTIONS ON HEALTH, July 7, 1986, at 4.
24. Lavine Remarks, supra note 20, at 2.
25. See generally Letter from M. Elizabeth Gee, Assistant Director, Bureau of Competition,
Federal Trade Commission, to Michael A. Duncheon (Mar. 17, 1986) [hereinafter Letter from Gee
to Duncheon] (opinion letter from FTC for "an incorporated joint venture of a limited number of
hospitals and physicians in two counties of California").
26. See Calvani, Competition in Health Care-FTC Views, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,479, at
56,275-85 (Feb. 20, 1986).
27. Id. at 56,284-85.
28. Stromberg, supra note 5, at 2. Recently, the following states have adopted legislation al-
lowing insurance company sponsored PPOs: California, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
30. Id. § 1. The section provides in full:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on convic-
1988]
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United States Supreme Court has interpreted this section as prohibiting only
"unreasonable" restraints of trade. 31 Any potential violation of section I must
be unreasonable in comparison to the economic realities of the marketplace.3 2
Yet, the Supreme Court has deemed certain agreements and business practices
to be per se unreasonable and hence illegal because they have an inherently ad-
verse effect on competition.33 These per se violations include the division of
markets, certain group boycotts, tying arrangements, and price-fixing.3 4 Thus,
the Supreme Court has established a rule of reason/per se dichotomy in analyz-
ing trade restraints under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
To violate section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act there must be a conspir-
acy among two or more individuals.3 5 One person's actions, no matter how
anticompetitive, are ineffective to form a conspiracy. Furthermore, there must
be an agreement between the conspiring parties. 36 An express agreement is not
required, because an unlawful agreement may be inferred from the words or
conduct of the parties in the course of their dealings. 37 Conscious parallel busi-
ness conduct is not sufficient to constitute a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act when the facts indicate that intelligent businessmen would act in
the same manner.38 Collusion, however, is per se illegal.39
tion thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or
if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
31. E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 54, 59-60 (1911).
32. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972) ("An analysis of the reasona-
bleness of particular restraints includes consideration of the facts peculiar to the business in which
the restraint is applied, the nature of the restraint and the reasons for its adoption.") (citing Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
33. See Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 607 (Court has "developed the doctrine that certain business
relationships are per se violations of the Act without regard to a consideration of their
reasonableness").
34. See id. at 601, 611 (agreements among competitors to sell their products only within mar-
keting territory allocated to each); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212
(1959) (group boycott: refusal by some traders to deal with certain other traders); Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (tying arrangements: "an agreement by a party to sell one
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product");
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 212-13 (1940) (price fixing: agreement be-
tween "members of a combination, controlling a substantial part of an industry, upon the prices
members are to charge for their commodity").
35. For the text of this section, see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
36. See generally S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS: CASES AND
COMMENTS 94-131 (1968) (describing agreements and indirect arrangements among competitors
involving price).
37. Id. at 100.
38. Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541-42 (1954); United
States v. American Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, 473 F. Supp. 147, 158-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Parallel
conduct in conjunction with an intent or attempt to achieve collusion, or acts against the parties'
own self-interest, may support a finding of concerted actions. See Theatre Enters., 346 U.S. at 541.
39. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (cooperative association that
establishes territorial licenses is a horizontal restraint and, therefore, a per se violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (group agreement to
raise and maintain spot market prices of gasoline constitutes conspiracy to fix prices, a per se viola-
tion of the Sherman Act, even though not all competition was eliminated from market and other
factors may have contributed to rise in price).
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Section 1 directly impacts PPOs and their delivery of health care.4° The
primary antitrust concern is price-fixing among competitors or potential com-
petitors, which is a per se violation of section 1.41 Any individual health care
provider may freely negotiate his price structure with a broker or other pur-
chaser of health care services. Once he chooses to participate in a PPO, how-
ever, any communication or concerted activity as to price schedules or fees
easily could be viewed as a per se violation.42
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 43 also applies to PPOs and punishes
"[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several states. ...."44 This prohibition against monopoli-
zation applies directly to PPOs. Provider-based PPOs are particularly subject to
scrutiny under section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act if they have sufficient
market power and contract with a large percentage of physicians in the relevant
geographic market.45 In evaluating any potential violation, a court will closely
review market shares and the number of participating physicians, as well as the
intent of the contracting parties.
Section 2 of the Clayton Act,46 as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 47
provides that it is
unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality,
where either or any of the purchasers involved in such discrimination
are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consump-
tion, or resale ... and where the effect of such discrimination may be
40. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 4-5 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1982); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S.
738, 739 (1976); see also infra notes 62-91 and accompanying text (discussing analogous United
States Supreme Court cases on price-fixing).
41. Examples of per se violations of § 1 include McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232
(1980); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940).
42. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 782-83 (1975) (price schedule set out by
local bar association is price fixing and a classic § I violation). The first clause of § 1 prohibits any
"contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade ... 
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
44. Id. Section 2 provides in full:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corpora-
tion, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not ex-
ceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
45. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT POLICY WITH RESPECT TO PHYSICIAN
AGREEMENTS TO CONTROL MEDICAL PREPAYMENT PLANS 15-16 (1981) [hereinafter FTC
REPORT].
46. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982).
47. Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, ch. 592, § 1, 49 Stat. 1526, 1526 (1936).
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substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.., or
to injure, destroy, or prevent competition .... 48
This section, on its face, applies only to "commerce," and seemingly exempts the
discounting of physicians' services.49 Nevertheless, a number of health care re-
lated claims have been based on this Act, and it is a potential means of challeng-
ing the legality of a PPO.50
Section 3 of the Clayton Act5 prohibits exclusive dealing arrangements
that reduce competition by requiring a purchaser to deal exclusively with the
seller. This provision also is apparently irrelevant to PPOs, because the Clayton
Act does not govern the delivery of services. However, such conduct when un-
dertaken by PPOs may violate the Sherman Act.
5 2
B. Other Relevant Statutes
The Federal Trade Commission Act 53 also must be considered when evalu-
ating the legality of certain actions taken by PPOs. The Act prohibits all
"[u]nfair methods of competition... and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce .... -54 This broadly worded legislation allows the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC)"5 great leeway in determining whether a PPO
promotes "unfair methods of competition." The meaning of "unfair" is relative
and has a variety of interpretations.5 6 One solution to this uncertainty is to
48. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982).
49. See Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 1325, 1340 (7th Cir. 1986).
50. See generally Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150
(1983) (sale of pharmaceutical products to state and local government hospitals for resale in compe-
tition with private pharmacies violates Robinson-Patman Act); Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Re-
tail Druggists Ass'n, 425 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1976) (nonprofit hospitals that purchase drugs at favored prices
from pharmaceutical companies are exempt from Robinson-Patman Act if drugs are for their own
use); De Modena v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 743 F.2d 1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1985) (HMOs
that purchase drugs for their members are purchasing for their own use and thus are exempt from
Robinson-Patman Act; any such drugs sold to those who are not members violates Act), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1229 (1985); Tim W. Koerner & Assocs., Inc. v. Aspen Labs, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 294, 302-
03 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (in absence of forbidden tying arrangements, manufacturer of orthopedic and
electrosurgical supplies is not precluded by Clayton Act or Sherman Act from refusing to deal with
someone), aff'd, 683 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1982).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
52. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1958); Pay Less Drug Stores
N.W., Inc. v. City Prods. Corp., 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,385 (D. Or. June 18, 1975).
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1982).
54. Id. § 45(a)(1).
55. The FTC is an independent regulatory body of the federal government responsible for in-
vestigating antitrust concerns and consumer protection actions. The FTC does not enforce the Sher-
man Act, but does have authority to act against "unfair methods of competition" under the powers
granted to it by the Federal Trade Commission Act. Id. § 45(a)(2); see FTC v. Cement Inst., 333
U.S. 683, 691 (1948). The FTC shares its antitrust duties with the United States Department of
Justice. The Department of Justice traditionally is concerned with price-fixing and other criminal
activities, while the FTC usually limits its investigations to noncriminal matters. The FTC also has
the authority to enforce a large number of consumer protection statutes. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-70k
(1982).
56. Raladam Co. v. FTC, 316 U.S. 149, 151 (1942) (FTC findings made with "meticulous par-
ticularity" and supported by substantial evidence should not be set aside); FTC v. R.F. Keppel &
Brother, Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934) (although courts should determine what practices or meth-
ods of competition are unfair, FTC determinations are of weight); Allen B. Wrisley Co. v. FTC, 113
F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1940) (unfair trade methods are not per se "unfair methods of competition");
[Vol. 66
PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS




PPOs present numerous antitrust concerns because they have the potential
to restrict competition among health care providers. Potential antitrust viola-
tions arise through the communication of prices, fees, and other economic
terms,58 the selection of the "preferred" provider panel,59 exclusive agreements
prohibiting providers from contracting with other alternative delivery systems, 60
and the selection of providers.
61
A. Price-Fixing
The greatest potential for antitrust violation in the operation of a PPO is
price-fixing among the member providers. As a rule, any joint effort by market
competitors creates opportunities for greater economic power. By agreeing to
set prices at an artificial level, physicians who control a substantial portion of a
health care market may unfairly utilize their market power.
In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society62 the United States
Supreme Court considered the legality of physician members of an alternative
delivery system setting their own maximum price schedule. 63 The physicians in
In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d 826, 830 (C.C.P.A.) ("unfair methods of competition," though
not defined by the statute relating to the powers of the FTC, include practices involving deception,
bad faith, fraud, or oppression, or acts found to be against public policy because of their dangerous
tendency to unduly hinder competition or create monopolies; Act was not intended to fetter free and
fair competition as commonly understood and practiced by honorable opponents in trade), cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 576 (1935); FTC v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir.
1932) (practices against public policy because of "dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition
or create a monopoly" constitute "unfair methods of competition"); People ex rel. Fahner v. Testa,
112 Ill. App. 2d 834, 838, 445 N.E.2d 1249, 1252 (1983) ("unfair practice" and "unfair methods of
competition" under terms of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act are "inher-
ently not susceptible to precise definition .... [They] must be defined on a case-by- case basis because
of the futility of trying to anticipate all unfair methods and practices a fertile mind might devise.");
Seaboard Sur. Co.v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 740, 743, 504 P.2d
1139, 1141 (1973) ("unfair method of competition" employed in Federal Trade Commission Act has
broader meaning than common law "unfair competition").
57. The FTC may act against a violator in several ways. It may bring suit in an administrative
action or seek an injunction in federal court. 15 U.S.C. § 57b (1982). When an entity believes that its
actions may violate the antitrust laws, it may ask the FTC for its opinion. The FTC will issue an
"opinion" letter giving its unbinding opinion as to the legality of a certain activity. Id. § 57b-4(d).
An opinion letter is provided by the FTC upon request. The FTC evaluates the factual circum-
stances and issues an opinion stating whether it will bring "action" or take "no action" against the
inquiring entity. The word "opinion," however, is crucial: even if the FTC states it will not take
action against the proposed activity, the letter is not legally binding. Nonetheless, receiving an opin-
ion letter is extremely important because it may result in substantial monetary savings for an entity
that later would have been found to violate the antitrust laws.
58. See infra notes 62-91 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
61. Opinion of the Attorney General of Ohio (to Laurel Call), 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,796, at 67,310 (Nov. 17, 1983).
62. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
63. Although the alternative delivery system was not identified as a PPO, it had all of the
1988]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Maricopa formed a nonprofit corporation to promote fee-for-service health care
and to provide an alternative to existing health insurance plans." The corpora-
tion established a schedule of maximum fees that member physicians could
charge for their services. Each physician was paid on the basis of this fee sched-
ule, which was computed using "relative values" and "conversion factors."
65
The member physicians were limited by the maximum fee schedule and could
not seek additional payments from their insured patients.
66
Under the plan, a patient was permitted to visit any physician, including
those who were not members of the corporation. 67 If she visited a physician
who was employed by the corporation, the patient was guaranteed complete
medical service at no cost.68 If a plan member visited a nonmember physician,
she would be reimbursed only up to the limit set by the maximum fee schedule
and would pay any additional charge.
69
The Supreme Court held the maximum fee schedule agreement illegal per
se under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 70 The Court concluded that
the agreement "permitted [the physicians] to sell their services to certain cus-
tomers at fixed prices and arguably to affect the prevailing market price of medi-
cal care."' 71 The Maricopa Court rejected the corporation's analogy to a
partnership or joint venture in which competitors pool their capital and share
the risk of loss as a single entity in a larger market. 72 Because the Maricopa
group was composed of independently competing physicians who agreed on fees
to charge their individual patients, the Court concluded that the agreement con-
stituted horizontal price-fixing.
73
The physicians contended that a per se analysis was inappropriate when the
agreement had procompetitive justifications. 74 They defended the agreement
under a rule of reason standard, noting that the corporation offered high- quality
health care, free choice of physicians, complete health coverage, and low premi-
ums. 75 The Court responded that "claims of enhanced competition are so un-
likely to prove significant in any particular case that we adhere to the rule [of per
se invalidation of all price-fixing agreements]. ' '76 Under the reasoning in Mari-
characteristics ofa PPO. Compare supra notes 9-27 and accompanying text (defining and describing
different types of PPOs) with Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 339-42 (setting out characteristics of the Mari-
copa alternative delivery system).
64. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 339.
65. Id. at 340. Each specialty was assigned a conversion factor and each medical service within
a specialty was assigned a relative value. The product of these two figures determined the fee sched-
ule. The corporation solicited advice from members of the medical community as to the proper
values of the relative values and conversion factors. Id.




70. Id. at 357.
71. Id. at 356.
72. Id. at 356-57.
73. Id. at 357.
74. Id. at 351.
75. Id. at 351-52.
76. Id. at 351.
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copa, a court must enforce the established interpretation of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act; any changes to that interpretation are matters for legislative
consideration.
7 7
The physicians relied on Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc.78 In that case the Supreme Court upheld a "blanket license" agree-
ment under which the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP) marketed the right to use copyrighted compositions of all its members
for a set fee. 79 The Maricopa Court distinguished Broadcast Music, however, on
the ground that ASCAP's "blanket license" was a different product from any-
thing an individual member could sell. 80 The doctors in Maricopa sold the same
medical services individually or as a group. The agreement was simply a vehicle
for fixing uniform prices for those services.
8 1
The corporation in Maricopa shared many of the characteristics of a PPO.
In addition to establishing a maximum fee schedule, the corporation undertook
utilization review to determine the appropriateness of the health care delivered,
and made payments to the member physicians through a form of insurance cov-
erage.8 2 Furthermore, patients who visited physicians not belonging to the cor-
poration were reimbursed up to the level of the maximum fee schedule for
member physicians.
83
Although Maricopa is the only Supreme Court decision involving price-fix-
ing by an entity similar to a PPO, administrative and lower court decisions have
addressed the topic. 84 In March 1986 the FTC issued an opinion letter to the
legal counsel of a PPO indicating that it will not blindly accept provider-based
PPOs generally formed along the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in
Maricopa.
85
In drafting its opinion letter the FTC examined a joint venture among six-
teen nonprofit hospitals and sixteen related physician groups in two California
77. Id. at 354-55. The Court concluded that "Congress may consider the exception that we are
not free to read into the statute." Id. at 355.
78. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
79. Id. at 8 n.13, 18, 24.
80. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 355-56. ASCAP members were still permitted to sell their own com-
positions; but under the blanket license ASCAP could sell compositions of any member. Broadcast
Music, 441 U.S. at 23.
81. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 356. The physicians, in defending the procompetitive justifications
of their organization, argued that maximum fee schedules "make it possible to provide consumers of
health care with a uniquely desirable form of insurance coverage that could not otherwise exist." Id.
at 351. The argument implies that the organization offered a product that individual physicians
could not. The Court later acknowledged that individual doctors cannot package services. Still, the
Court insisted that the instant agreements "fit squarely into the horizontal price-fixing mold." Id. at
357.
82. Id. at 339-40.
83. Id. at 341.
84. See Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986); Letter
from Charles F. Rule, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice, to F.M. Bush
III, Esq. (Apr. 7, 1987) [hereinafter Letter from Rule to Bush] (opinion letter for a PPO); Letter
from Charles F. Rule, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice, to Robert Tay-
lor (October 3, 1986) [hereinafter Letter from Rule to Taylor] (same).
85. Letter from Gee to Duncheon, supra note 25, at 2. Mr. Duncheon, the legal counsel for the
PPO, did not identify his client. Id. at 1.
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counties.86 The proposed staff of this PPO was comprised of equal numbers of
the institutional providers and physicians. Each shareholder was to pay $10,000
to purchase stock in the PPO, which would be used for operating funds.8 7 Ad-
ministrative fees were to be charged to the payors and, most likely, to participat-
ing providers to cover the expenses of utilization review, quality assurance, and
beneficiary service programs. Deficits were to be paid out of capital reserves,
The PPO contracted with a little over ten percent of the physicians in the
area and with hospitals for approximately sixteen percent of their beds. 88 The
PPO's contracts were not exclusive, and other providers and payors were free to
participate with other alternative delivery systems. Physicians were to be inte-
grated fully into all aspects of the PPO, including marketing, contracting, qual-
ity assurance, and utilization review. The stated purpose of the PPO was to
"compete successfully in the market for the sale and delivery of health care serv-
ices to group health care purchasers."
'8 9
The FTC, in its advisory opinion, did not decide whether such an organiza-
tion was per se illegal. It did indicate that, under the guidelines of Maricopa,
there was a substantial likelihood that such a provider-based PPO could be
found per se illegal because of the proposed negotiation of price terms.90 This
conclusion raises some serious concerns about the continued viability of pro-
vider-based PPOs. The FTC reached its conclusion despite the fact the agree-
ment in question did not require exclusivity among the PPO contractors,
allowed the PPO providers to compete among themselves, and represented only
a modest market share.9 1
B. Exclusive Dealing Arrangements
Exclusive dealing arrangements occur when a physician who is a member of
a PPO agrees not to contract with other alternative delivery systems. Such an
arrangement affects the ability of a competing alternative delivery system to en-
list the best doctors. Exclusive contracts are evaluated under a rule of reason
analysis. In determining the validity of the agreement, a court generally consid-
ers the degree of competition foreclosed by the agreement, its duration, and the
market share of the contracting parties.
92
In one of the few actions taken in this area, the Department of Justice ad-
vised the Stanislaus Preferred Provider Organization, Inc. that it would take
action against the organization on the ground that the PPO's exclusive agree-
ments constituted an unlawful conspiracy to restrain competition in the delivery
of health care.93 The Stanislaus PPO enrolled fifty percent of the physicians in a
86. Letter from Gee to Duncheon, supra note 25, at 1.
87. Letter from Gee to Duncheon, supra note 25, at 2.
88. Letter from Gee to Duncheon, supra note 25, at 2.
89. Letter from Ged to Duncheon, supra note 25, at 2.
90. Letter from Gee to Duncheon, supra note 25, at 2, 3, 5-8.
91. Letter from Gee to Duncheon, supra note 25, at 2.
92. See infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
93. Department of Justice, Press Release at 1 (Oct. 12, 1984) [hereinafter Press Release]; 47
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1186, at 721 (Oct. 18, 1984).
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major county in California and ninety percent of the physicians serving the larg-
est city in that county.94 According to the Department of Justice, the group was
organized to inhibit and foreclose the development of competing PPOs as well as
to reduce price competition among physicians delivering health care in the
county. Furthermore, the PPO required its members to agree not to contract
with any other PPOs. 95 Faced with a potential lawsuit under section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, the Stanislaus PPO dissolved.
96
C. Boycotts
Another potential antitrust concern is the group boycott. A boycott can be
a coercive tool that denies the boycotted party a free market in which to com-
pete. In the PPO context, a boycott exists if an organization limits the number
or type of preferred providers allowed to join its panel. Such limitations can
arise in several ways. The most prominent are credential restrictions, exclusion
of certain specialties, exclusion of nonphysicians, and utilization review determi-
nations that terminate a provider's membership on the panel. Group boycotts
are reviewed under both the rule of reason and per se analyses.
97
In Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Virginia 98 an
organization of clinical psychologists brought suit against Blue Shield of Vir-
ginia, alleging a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Blue Shield
had refused to pay for services rendered by clinical psychologists that were not
billed through a physician. The practical effect of the Blue Shield plan was to
force psychologists to work through physicians. 99 The psychologists' organiza-
tion charged that the plan reduced their ability to compete with physicians gen-
erally and psychiatrists specifically. 100
The district court applied a rule of reason analysis in holding that Blue
94. Press Release, supra note 93, at 2.
95. Press Release, supra note 93, at 2.
96. Press Release, supra note 93, at 1; McGrath Remarks, supra note 8, at 5.
97. The appropriate analysis depends on the purpose of the boycott. See Northwest Wholesale
Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293-98 (1985) (absent a showing
of market power or unique access to a business element necessary for effective competition, the rule
of reason is appropriate in lieu of the per se approach in analyzing a boycott claim); E.A. McQuade
Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1972) (per se
standard used only for arrangements presumptively unreasonable, such as a group boycott), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973). Recently, courts have applied the rule of reason analysis to boycott
cases in the health care field, often finding an antitrust violation. See, e.g., Wilk v. American Medi-
cal Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 225-26 (7th Cir. 1983) (applied modified rule of reason test for physicians'
alleged boycott of chiropractors), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984); Virginia Academy of Clinical
Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476, 484-86 (4th Cir. 1980) (rule of reason analysis
used to find insurance plan proviso requiring psychologists' fees be billed through physician violates
Sherman Act), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981); Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352,
1369-70 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (rule of reason analysis applied to find no antitrust violation of physicians'
boycott of specific surgeon).
98. 469 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Va. 1979), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.
1980).
99. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476, 478 (4th
Cir. 1980).
100. Virginia Academy, 469 F. Supp. at 560-61.
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Shield had not violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.10 In examining the market
affected, the court found that clinical psychologists were not equivalent to psy-
chiatrists as providers of therapy. Although psychologists and psychiatrists
both offered psychotherapy, psychiatrists were capable of providing a full range
of medical treatment to patients.' 0 2 A psychologist could offer comparable
treatment only in cooperation with a medical doctor.103 Once the psychologist
cooperated with a physician, he was treated equally with a psychiatrist under the
Blue Shield plan. l ° 4 Thus, the court concluded that Blue Shield did not unrea-
sonably restrain the clinical psychologists' trade.' 0 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the
lower court that a rule of reason rather than a per se analysis was appropriate.
Merely calling an action a "boycott" does not render it per se illegal.' 0 6 The
court stated that "[b]ecause of the special considerations involved in the delivery
of health services, we are not prepared to apply a per se rule of illegality to
medical plans which refuse or condition payments to competing or potentially
competing providers."'
10 7
The court of appeals did not agree, however, that Blue Shield's plan passed
the rule of reason test. The court stressed that it must evaluate "the impact of
the challenged practice upon competitive conditions."'10 8 Contrary to the dis-
trict court's finding, the appellate court found that clinical psychologists and
psychiatrists did compete in that they both provided psychotherapy 0 9 under
state license."10 The legislature encouraged,1 1' and the medical field recognized,
competition in psychotherapeutic treatment.112 Blue Shield's plan had the effect
of forcing two independent economic entities, the psychologist and psychiatrist,
to act in concert, and necessarily diminished competition. The court of appeals
concluded the plan was therefore an unreasonable restraint of trade forbidden by
the Sherman Act.
113
Selecting providers for the PPO panel also may pose antitrust problems.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 560.
103. Id. at 560-61. The court noted that such cooperation was generally a matter of "medical
necessity." Id. at 560.
104. The only way in which psychologists and psychiatrists were treated differently was that the
psychologists' bills were filtered through a supervising physician. This procedure might have
wounded the professional pride of psychologists, but provided a reasonable supervisory process that
did not violate antitrust laws. Id. at 561.
105. Id.
106. Virginia Academy, 624 F.2d at 484.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 485; see also National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1979) (test required by the rule of reason is whether the action promotes or suppresses competition).
109. Virginia Academy, 624 F.2d at 485. The court wrote that the competition between psychol-
ogists and psychiatrists "is susceptible to judicial notice." Id.
110. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-273(10), -274, -309.1, -936 (1986).
111. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-824 (1986).
112. The court pointed to the statement by Dr. Levi W. Hulley, Jr. that "[tfhe Medical Society
of Virginia should take a firm stand on this encroachment [by psychologists into the therapy field]
and seek to stop it once and for all." Virginia Academy, 624 F.2d at 481 n.6.
113. Id. at 485.
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The FTC approved a proposal submitted by Private Health Care Systems, Inc.
(Private Health) that enrolled only ten to fifteen percent of the providers in an
area.1 14 Private Health agreed not to enter into employment agreements with
any groups of independently practicing, competing physicians. Under the plan,
each physician was allowed to negotiate individually her fee schedule with Pri-
vate Health. Insurers would subscribe with Private Health and the organization
would not attempt to insure more than thirty percent of the population. In
addition, no institutional provider, physician, employer, or insurer had any fi-
nancial interest in the PPO.
1 15
The FTC categorized Private Health as a joint purchasing agent for com-
mercial health insurers and found no potential antitrust violations. 116 It further
concluded that the PPO was most likely to be procompetitive since it was unable
to acquire, maintain, or improperly use market power. The FTC warned, how-
ever, that its opinion was valid only so long as the public interest was served.1
1 7
D. Refusals to Deal
Concerted refusals to deal, like boycotts, can be improperly used to manip-
ulate the free market. Although there have been no cases in this area involving
PPOs, there have been a great number of actions involving health care provid-
ers. Two of the most commonly litigated areas have been the refusal to grant
staff privileges" 18 and tying arrangements granting the exclusive right to provide
one service offered by the hospital.' 19
In Robinson v. Magovern 120 Allegheny General Hospital denied the request
of Dr. John N. Robinson for staff privileges as a cardiothoracic surgeon.' 2 ' The
hospital rejected his application based on a number of factors, which included a
shortage of operating room space and time; the fact that he was on the hospital
114. FTC Advisory Opinion to Health Care Management Assocs., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)




118. See, eg., Green v. City of St. Petersburg, 154 Fla. 339, 17 So. 2d 517 (1944); Jacobs v.
Martin, 20 N.J. Super. 531, 90 A.2d 151 (1952); Halberstadt v. Kissane, 51 Misc. 2d 634, 273
N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd, 31 A.D.2d 568, 294 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1968); Khan v. Suburban
Community Hosp., 45 Ohio St. 2d 39, 340 N.E.2d 398 (1976); Armstrong v. Board of Directors, 553
S.W.2d 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).
119. See, eg., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Smith v. Northern
Mich. Hosps., 703 F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1983); Dos Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical
Center, 684 F.2d 1346 (7th Cir. 1982); City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 562 F.2d 280 (4th Cir.
1977), vacated, 435 U.S. 992 (1978); Harron v. United Hosp. Center, Inc., 522 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976); Zamiri v. William Beaumont Hosp., 430 F. Supp. 875 (E.D.
Mich. 1977); Dattilo v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 23' Ariz. App. 392, 533 P.2d 700 (1975); Centeno v.
Roseville Community Hosp., 107 Cal. App. 3d 62, 167 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1979); Blank v. Palo Alto-
Stanford Hosp. Center, 234 Cal. App. 2d 377, 44 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1965); Radiology Professional
Corp. v. Trinidad Area Health Ass'n, 195 Colo. 253, 577 P.2d 748 (1978); Moles v. White, 336 So.
2d 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Rush v. City of St. Petersburg, 205 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967); Benell v. City of Virginia, 258 Minn. 559, 104 N.W.2d 633 (1960); Adler v. Montefiore Hosp.
Ass'n of W. Pa., 453 Pa. 60, 311 A.2d 634 (1973).
120. 521 F. Supp. 842, (W.D. Pa. 1981) aff'd mem., 688 F.2d 824, (3rd Cir.) cert. denied, 459
U.S. 971 (1982).
121. Id. at 848.
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staff of seven other regional hospitals and would be unable to commit substantial
time to the hospital; negative recommendations; and his failure to author signifi-
cant scholarly publications. 122 As a result of his denial of staff privileges, Dr.
Robinson filed an antitrust action against the hospital and several of its thoracic
surgeons.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
held that Dr. Robinson had failed to establish that the hospital and its staff had
unreasonably restrained trade under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act;
nor, according to the court, had the hospital monopolized the delivery of health
care services under section 2 by denying him staff privileges.123 As to section 1,
the Robinson court emphasized that the hospital's restrictive staff selection pol-
icy was reasonable, because its procompetitive effects-such as enhancing Alle-
gheny General Hospital's reputation for excellence in patient care, teaching, and
research-outweighed any anticompetitive effects.124 The court agreed with the
hospital that by restricting membership, Allegheny General improved its ability
to compete with other hospitals and thus raised the prevailing level of care in the
community, thereby benefitting the public.'
25
With regard to section 2 of the Sherman Act, the Robinson court noted that
a plaintiff alleging monopolization must prove possession of monopoly power by
willful design.12 6 The hospital in Robinson did not hold monopoly power in the
thoracic surgery market: it had only a thirty percent market share and five ac-
tive competitors.' 27 Similarly, the thoracic surgery staff itself did not possess
monopoly power.128 The hospital's success in the area of cardiothoracie surgery
resulted from medical ability rather than illegal conspiracy. The court therefore
dismissed Dr. Robinson's section 2 claim.1
2 9
In Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde13 0 the United States
Supreme Court addressed the ability of a hospital to enter into a tying arrange-
ment' 31 that granted a physician group the exclusive right to provide health care
services at the hospital.' 32 The hospital in Jefferson Parish entered into an ex-
clusive five-year contract with a group of physicians to provide anesthesiology
services for the hospital's operating rooms. One physician brought suit alleging
that as result of the contract he had been unfairly excluded from practicing anes-
122. Id. at 866.
123. See id. at 919-24. Under a separate claim, the court further held that the hospital staff did
not interfere with a prospective contractual relationship between Dr. Robinson and the hospital
when the hospital independently elected to deny him staff privileges. Id. at 926.
124. Id. at 919-23.
125. Id. at 919-20.
126. Id. at 886; see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
127. Robinson, 521 F. Supp. at 887.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. 466 U.S. 2(1984). For an in-depth discussion of the effects of Jefferson Parish, see Classen,
Jefferson Parish and Its Progeny: More Efficient Health Care at What Price?, 75 KY. L.J. 441 (1987).
131. A tying arrangement exists when a person agrees to sell one product, the "tying product,"
only on the condition that the vendee purchase another product, the "tied product." BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 1361-62 (5th ed. 1979).
132. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 4.
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thesiology at the hospital. 133
The Supreme Court rejected a per se condemnation of all tying arrange-
ments 134 and instead applied a reasonableness test in upholding the exclusive
contract. 35 Although the hospital's patients were forced to choose an anesthe-
siologist associated with the contracting physician group, there was no evidence
that the nature of the "tying product" (hospital surgery) or the "tied product"
(anesthesia) had been adversely affected by the contract. 136 In concurrence, Jus-
tice O'Connor emphasized that exclusive contracts have procompetitive effects
that should be safeguarded.
1 37
IV. THE EROSION OF ANTITRUST PROTECTIONS
At the same time that government regulation of the health care industry
was rapidly increasing, traditional health care exemptions from the antitrust
laws were being eroded.1 3 8 The health care exemption has rested on a variety of
legal grounds. The most common grounds for arguing a health care exemption
are the "learned profession" exemption, the state action doctrine, the implied
repeal argument, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.
133. Id. at 4-7.
134. Id. at 26-29. In holding this tying arrangement per se illegal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Jefferson Parish had pointed to "market imperfections," such as
health insurance (as a disincentive to compare costs) and the lack of sufficient information concern-
ing competing hospitals. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286, 290 (5th Cir.
1982) rev'd, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). The Supreme Court wrote that these factors "do not generate the
kind of market power that justifies condemnation of tying." Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 27.
135. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 29-32.
136. Id. at 31. The Court found that the average hospital patient would not distinguish between
two certified anesthesiologists and, even if he could, was free to choose another hospital. Id. at 26-
28.
137. Id. at 43-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor noted the many positive aspects
of the tying arrangement:
The tie-in improves patient care and permits more efficient hospital operation in a
number of ways. From the viewpoint of hospital management, the tie-in ensures 24-hour
anesthesiology coverage, aids in standardization of procedures and efficient use of equip-
ment, facilitates flexible scheduling of operations, and permits the hospital more effectively
to monitor the quality of anesthesiological services. Further, the tying arrangement is ad-
vantageous to patients because, as the District Court found, the closed anesthesiology de-
partment places upon the hospital, rather than the individual patient, responsibility to
select the physician who is to provide anesthesiological services. The hospital also assumes
the responsibility that the anesthesiologist will be available, will be acceptable to the sur-
geon, and will provide suitable care to the patient. In assuming these responsibilities-
responsibilities that a seriously ill patient frequently may be unable to discharge-the hos-
pital provides a valuable service to its patients. And there is no indication that patients
were dissatisfied with the quality of anesthesiology that was provided at the hospital or that
patients wished to enjoy the services of anesthesiologists other than those that the hospital
employed.
Id.
138. Standing to bring an antitrust action has been expanded to include health care consumers,
and not merely the health care providers who have been potentially injured by anticompetitive be-
havior. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 478-85 (1982) (Blue Shield subscribers
had standing under Clayton Act to seek treble damages for Blue Shield's alleged Sherman Act
violations).
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A. "Learned Profession" Exemption
Originally, health care providers were viewed as being exempt from the
antitrust laws because the practice of medicine was a "learned profession" and
not "commerce." 139 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,140 however, the Supreme
Court held that professionals such as physicians and lawyers were not benefited
by the "learned profession" antitrust exemption. The Court stated: "The nature
of the occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman
Act .... nor is the public-service aspect of professional practice controlling in
determining whether § 1 includes professions.' 4
In Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital 14 2 the Supreme Court
rejected the contention that provision of health care services was inherently local
in nature and not subject to the Sherman Act. 143 The Court found that a hospi-
tal's activities may have a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce within the
meaning of the Sherman Act. 144 By recognizing the commercial nature of
health care, the Rex Hospital decision foreclosed the professional exemption
argument. 145
B. State Action Doctrine
It has also been argued that, because the health care field is so heavily regu-
lated, providers are immune from federal antitrust laws under the state action
doctrine.' 4 6 In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. 147 the Supreme Court concluded
139. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-88 (1975). It was argued that Congress
intended to exempt professions, and furthermore that "competition is inconsistent with the practice
of a profession because enhancing profit is not the goal of professional activities; the goal is to pro-
vide services necessary to the community." Id. at 786.
140. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
141. Id. at 787 (citing United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 489
(1950); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945)).
142. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
143. Id. at 741-46.
144. Id. at 745-46.
145. Id. at 746-47; see City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 562 F.2d 280, 283 (4th Cir. 1977),
vacated, 435 U.S. 992 (1978); St. Bernard Gen. Hosp. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n of New Orleans, 510
F.2d 1121, 1125-26 (5th Cir. 1975); Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 490 F.2d
48, 50 (3d Cir. 1973) (district court dismissals reversed because defendants' activities in the health
care field may substantially affect interstate commerce).
A direct connection with interstate commerce clearly will bring a health care provider under
federal law. See Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 629-30 (9th Cir.) (national
scope of dental society's program affects interstate commerce), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977);
Levin v. Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Hosps., 354 F.2d 515, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (JCAH
accreditation examinations held clearly interstate activities); Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v.
United States, 306 F.2d 379, 386 (9th Cir.) (pharmacists' association convicted of fixing the price of
drugs received from out-of-state manufacturer), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); United States
Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565, 576 -77 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (multi-
state activities, along with purchases of orthodontic supplies from out-of-state suppliers, sufficiently
affect interstate commerce).
146. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
147. 428 U.S. 579 (1976). In Cantor, the Supreme Court severely limited the utilization of the
state action defense. The Detroit Edison Company, the city's electric company, gave free light bulbs
to its customers. The plaintiff, who sold light bulbs at retail, claimed the giveaway was an illegal tie-
in. Detroit Edison sought protection under the state action doctrine, claiming exemption from the
antitrust laws because it was regulated by the state utility commission. Id. at 582-83. The Court
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that the mere regulation of an entity's activities is insufficient to confer immu-
nity; the state must mandate its actions.148 Nonetheless, the state action doc-
trine has since been used successfully as a defense by carefully regulated health
care entities.
149
In Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas City 150 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a municipal ordinance
authorizing the City to use a single ambulance company to provide all of its
ambulance service. 15 1 That company's competitors brought suit, claiming that
the exclusive contract violated the antitrust laws by foreclosing them from oper-
ating in the metropolitan area. 152 However, the court of appeals found that a
state statute permitting cities to "contract with one or more" operators to pro-
vide ambulance services153 was a sufficient expression of state policy to provide
antitrust immunity, and the restraint was necessary and reasonable for the provi-
sion of health care services.
154
C. Implied Repeal
A third defense to potential antitrust liability is the implied repeal of the
federal antitrust laws to the extent of any inconsistency in legislation subse-
appeared to hold that Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943), the initial state action case, was
limited to barring suits against state officials. See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 589-92. The Court further
noted that Detroit Edison had originated the activity in question while the state remained neutral.
Id. at 584-85.
148. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 589-92.
149. The state action doctrine provides that state action cannot grant an individual an exemption
from violating the Sherman Act. "[A] state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sher-
man Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful .... " Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (citing Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332, 344-
47 (1904)); see Blumstein & Calvani, State Action as a Shield and a Sword in a Medical Services
Antitrust Context: Parker v. Brown in Constitutional Perspective, 1978 DUKE L.J. 389.
In Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977), the Supreme Court set forth several factors
to identify those state actions that immunize a practice from the antitrust laws. First, there must be
a clearly defined state policy that compels the practice in question. Second, this policy must be
actively supervised by the state. Id. at 361-62.
An important distinction exists between the regulatory activities of the state and local govern-
ments. The Supreme Court addressed these differences in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). The Court refused to extend antitrust immunity to the activities of a
municipally-owned power company. In discussing the distinction between state and local govern-
ments with regard to the Parker doctrine, Justice Brennan, for the plurality, stated: "We therefore
conclude that the Parker doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of
government by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to displace
competition with regulation or monopoly public service." Id. at 413. Chief Justice Burger, in his
concurring opinion, emphasized that he would require an even stricter showing that the practice was
compelled by the state. Id. at 424-26 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Consequently, the Louisiana Power
decision removes the activities of most municipally-owned hospitals from the protection of the state
action doctrine.
150. 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985).
151. Id. at 1015. In Gold Cross, Kansas City established a municipal trust, which contracted
with a single ambulance company to provide ambulance services. Because one corporation held the
city's sole ambulance license, the other companies in the city were foreclosed from operating in the
metropolitan area. Id. at 1008.
152. Id.
153. Mo. REv. STAT. § 67.300(1) (1986).
154. Gold Cross, 705 F.2d at 1012-14.
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quently passed. This defense is founded on the theory that a clearly contradic-
tory regulatory system evidences an intent to supercede conflicting antitrust
laws. 155 The application of this doctrine has been very limited, and it is not
favored by the courts.
156
The implied repeal argument has been raised repeatedly in the context of
the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974
(NHPRDA).1 57 In Huron Valley Hospital v. City of Pontiac158 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected a claim that a state
agency's authority to regulate hospital expansion under NHPRDA did not im-
ply an exemption from the antitrust laws for hospitals. 159 In National Gerimedi-
cal Hospital & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City 160 the Supreme
Court stated that NHPRDA was "not so incompatible with antitrust concerns
as to create a 'pervasive' repeal of the antitrust laws as applied to every action
taken in response to the health-care planning process."' 161 The Court then held
that there was "no specific conflict between the Act and the antitrust laws in this
case."' 62 Such reasoning implies that conflict may arise in other circumstances,
so that the implied repeal doctrine still may have continuing viability.
North Carolina ex rel. Edmisten v. P.LA. Asheville, Inc. 163 provides further
support for an implied exemption under NHPRDA. In P.I.A. Asheville the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit initially rejected an anti-
trust claim against the Psychiatric Institute of America (PIA) for having two
psychiatric hospitals in the same geographic area.164 The court reasoned that
because PIA had received a Certificate of Need for both transactions, it had
implied immunity from the antitrust laws under NHPRDA. 165 On rehearing,
the court of appeals reversed its previous decision, and found that the hospital
was not entitled to state action immunity on the basis of its acquisition of a
155. See, eg., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719-20 (1975)
(antitrust laws must give way if regulatory scheme is to work).
156. See National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 452
U.S. 378, 388-89 (1981) (when Congress does not intend antitrust laws to be repealed, intent must be
clear).
157. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k to 300n-6 (1982), repealed by Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660,
§ 701(a), 100 Stat. 3743, 3799 (1986).
158. 666 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1981).
159. Id. at 1033-34.
160. 452 U.S. 378 (1981).
161. Id. at 393.
162. Id. The case concerned "health system agencies" (HSAs) under NHPRDA. The peti-
tioner, an acute care hospital, had sought to enter into a participating hospital agreement with Blue
Cross of Kansas City. Id. at 380. Blue Cross refused because the hospital's construction had not
been approved by the local HSA, a planning body designated by NHPRDA. Id. at 381. As a result
of the HSA announcement that it would approve no additional acute-care facilities, the hospital did
not seek approval for its construction. Id. at 381-82. Petitioner sued, alleging a wrongful refusal to
deal and conspiracy under the Sherman Act. Id. at 382. Blue Cross defended on the implied repeal
argument. Id.
163. 722 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'd on rehearing, 740 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1003 (1985). On motion for rehearing the court of appeals found that the NHPRDA did
not impliedly repeal the application of the antitrust laws. North Carolina ex rel. Edmisten v. P.I.A.
Asheville, Inc., 740 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985).
164. P.LA. Asheville, 722 F.2d at 61.
165. Id. at 60-63.
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Certificate of Need and that NHPRDA did not implicitly repeal the application
of the antitrust laws to the health care field.
166
D. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine also has limited applicability to the health
care field. 167 The doctrine, named for two Supreme Court decisions, 168 amounts
to a first amendment antitrust exception. 169 "Joint efforts to influence public
officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate com-
petition." 170 The Supreme Court held, however, that an entity can misuse its
constitutional right to petition and lobby the government in order to achieve an
anticompetitive effect. 17 1 A situation may arise in which conduct "ostensibly
directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover.., an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and
the application of the Sherman Act would be justified."'172 Consequently, par-
ticipants in an adjudicatory or administrative proceeding are held to a standard
of good faith regarding their actions. 17 3 At the same time, however, efforts to
influence a public official to achieve an anticompetitive effect will not violate the
Sherman Antitrust Act.
174
In Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad 175 an abortion clinic
sued a group of physicians for boycotting its facility. 176 The physicians argued
that these actions, as well as their contact with the local health authorities, were
protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 177 The court found the Noerr-Pen-
166. P.LA. Asheville, 740 F.2d at 285.
167. The defense based on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine can be summarized by the following
language: "Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though
intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a
broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act." United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657, 670 (1965).
168. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
169. In essence, the doctrine guarantees freedom of speech by preventing the Sherman Act from
being utilized to restrict actions by competitors that constitute "speech."
170. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670.
171. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139. For an in-depth discussion of this area, see Barnett, Joint Action by
Competitors to Influence Public Officials: Antitrust Exemption or Trap?, 24 Bus. LAW. 1097 (1969);
Bern, The Noerr-Pennington Immunity for Petitioning in Light of City of Lafayette's Restriction on
the State Action Immunity, 1980 ARIz. ST. L.J. 279; Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influ-
ence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 80 (1977); Oppenheim, Antitrust Immunity for Joint Efforts to Influence Adjudication Before
Administrative Agencies and Courts-From Noerr-Pennington to Trucking Unlimited, 29 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 209 (1972); Robinson, Reconciling Antitrust and the First Amendment, 48 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1335 (1979); Walden, More About Noerr-Lobbying, Antitrust and The Right to Petition, 14
UCLA L. REV. 1211 (1967); Note, Limiting the Antitrust Immunity for Concerted Attempts to Influ-
ence Courts and Adjudicative Agencies: Analogies to Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process, 86
HARV. L. REV. 715 (1973); Note, Application of the Sherman Act to Attempts to Influence Govern-
ment Action, 81 HARv. L. REV. 847 (1968).
172. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
173. Id. at 140.
174. Id. at 139-40.
175. 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
176. Id. at 535.
177. Id. at 544.
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nington issue triable and denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. t7 8
Similarly, in United States Dental Institute v. American Association of Orthodon-
tists,179 a motion to dismiss was denied when a national organization's attempts
to influence a state agency not to certify postgraduate courses in orthodontics
were allegedly part of a larger plan, undertaken in bad faith, to restrict the
number of practicing orthodontists. This action would have protected the or-
ganization's monopoly.180 In Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City,' 8'
however, the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri
recognized the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as protecting the right of a group of
ambulance companies to lobby a municipality for the exclusive right to provide
ambulance services in the municipality.18 2 These judicial interpretations of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine provide a viable but limited antitrust exemption.
E. McCarran-Ferguson Act
The McCarran-Ferguson Act'83 is another ground for a health care exemp-
tion from the federal antitrust laws. The Act specifically exempts the "business
of insurance" from the antitrust laws to the extent the business is regulated by
state law.184 The critical issue arising from the Act is what constitutes the
"business of insurance."' 185 In Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug
Co.' 86 the Supreme Court set forth the necessary criteria for determining
whether conduct may be considered the business of insurance under the Act.'
87
The Court stated that one must consider whether the practice has the effect of
178. Id. at 542-43.
179. 396 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
180. Id. at 581-84.
181. 538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982), aff'd, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1003 (1985).
182. Id. at 969.
183. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
184. The McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed in 1944 to counteract the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), which held the
business of insurance to be interstate commerce and thus subject to regulation under the Sherman
Act. Id. at 553, 560; see SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 458 (1969). Antitrust actions
involving insurance companies almost always focus on the McCarran-Ferguson Act. To obtain an
exemption, an entity must meet the three requirements of the Act: (I) "business of insurance," 15
U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1982); (2) "to the extent that such business is not regulated by State Law," id.
§ 1012(b); and (3) preserving antitrust jurisdiction where there is a boycott, coercion, or intimida-
tion, id. § 1013(b).
185. The "business of insurance" was defined by the Supreme Court in SEC v. National See.,
Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). The Supreme Court held that a state statute designed to protect the
interests of those who own stock in insurance companies did not constitute sufficient state regulation
of the business of insurance to provide protection from the federal securities antitrust laws under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. at 457. In the context of discussing the relationship between different
activities in which an insurance company may be engaged, Justice Marshall stated:
The [McCarran-Ferguson Act] did not purport to make the States supreme in regulating
all the activities of insurance companies; its language refers not to the persons or compa-
nies who are subject to state regulation, but to laws "regulating the business of insurance,"
Insurance companies may do many things which are subject to paramount federal regula-
tion; only when they are engaged in the "business of insurance" does the statute apply.
Id. at 459-60.
186. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
187. Id. at 211-13.
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transferring or spreading the policy holder's risk,188 whether the practice is an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured,18 9
and whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industries. 190
Traditionally, it has been held that the system of third-party payors-such
as Blue Cross/Blue Shield contracting to provide health care services for sub-
scribers or for beneficiaries as opposed to indemnifying the costs of insureds-is
a type of insurance. 19 1 Various courts have also found the business of insurance
to include tie-ins of insurance to loans, 192 uniform agreements with hospitals
specifying benefits, 193 tie-ins of certain terms of insurance coverage to title in-
surance policies,' 94 and defining conditions for dealing with third-party provid-
ers of covered services.'
9 5
Although liberally construed, the definition of "insurance" in health care
coverage is not without its limits. In Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v.
Pireno 19 6 the Supreme Court concluded that the functions of peer review com-
mittees in advising insurance companies as to the necessity of certain treatments
did not constitute the business of insurance.1 97 As under the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, the courts have closely scrutinized any effort by a health care provider
to claim protection under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.'9 8
V. THE VIABILITY OF PROVIDER-BASED PPOs
Despite recent changes in health care law, provider-based PPOs remain a
188. Id.
189. Id. at 215-16.
190. Id. at 224; see also Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 128-29 (1982) (sum-
marizing the Court's holding in Royal Drug).
191. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 481 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1093 (1973); Anderson v. Medical Serv. of D.C., 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,884 (E.D. Va.
Feb. 10, 1976) (mem.); Manasen v. California Dental Servs., 424 F. Supp 657, 664-67 (N.D. Cal
1976), re'd per curiam on other grounds, 638 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1979). The extent to which the
criteria set forth in Royal Drug may affect these holdings is not yet clear.
192. See, e.g., Dexter v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 527 F.2d 233, 235 (2d Cir. 1975); Ad-
drisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725, 727 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929
(1975); cf. Comment, The McCarran Act's Antitrust Exemption for "the Business of Insurance'" A
Shrinking Umbrella, 43 TENN. L. REV. 329, 351-56 (1976) (questioning the court's reasoning in
Addrisi).
193. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 481 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1093 (1973).
194. McIlhenny v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 364, 368-69 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
195. Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 417 F. Supp. 1104, 1109 (E.D. Pa.
1976), aff'd per curiam, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977).
196. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
197. Id. at 134.
198. Traditionally, the courts have narrowly construed any express statutory exemption to the
antitrust laws such as the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458
U.S. 119, 126 (1982); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979);
Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973); United States v. Mc-
Kesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956). See generally Hahn v. Oregon Physicians Servs.,
689 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1982) (refusal of provider of prepaid health insurance to cover podiatric
services was not "the business of insurance"), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133 (1983); Nurse Midwifery
Assocs. v. Hibbett, 549 F. Supp. 1185 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (denial of medical malpractice insurance
by company induced by physician interested in eliminating competition was not "business of
insurance").
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viable alternative for delivering high-quality, cost-efficient health care. The FTC
and the Department of Justice have recognized the benefits of PPOs and other
alternative delivery systems, but at the same time have cautioned against incor-
porating provisions that may have undesired anticompetitive effects. 199 Conse-
quently, provider-based PPOs must be carefully tailored to the informal and
formal guidelines set forth by these regulatory agencies and by the Supreme
Court in Maricopa.
20 0
The Department of Justice has informally released the criteria it will con-
sider in determining whether a PPO affects competition. Ultimately, the De-
partment must determine if a PPO "facilitate[s] anticompetitive price-fixing
agreements among providers or ... inhibit[s] significantly the formation and
entry of other joint ventures that would provide competing services to third-
party payers." 20 1 Crucial to any such finding is whether a provider-based PPO
creates actual or theoretical antitrust concerns.2 0 2 Relevant organizational as-
pects that bear on this issue include the proportion of providers in the market
who are PPO members, the availability of actual or potential competitive alter-
natives, activities of the PPO that could limit competition among members, the
ability of panel members to participate in competing organizations, the parties'
intent in forming or operating the PPO, and any procompetitive benefits derived
from the organization.
20 3
J. Paul McGrath, former Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Di-
vision of the Department of Justice, has elaborated on the Department's guide-
lines.2° 4 He emphasized the necessity of an "efficiency-enhancing integration"
sufficient to avoid Maricopa's per se rule, and recommended agreements among
physicians to accept discount fees with no balance billing of patients, utilization
review by the PPO, joint marketing, PPO administration of claims, and an
agreement by a panel of limited size to bid for contracts against other such
groups. 205 Though following these guidelines does not guarantee immunity
from antitrust liability, it certainly provides a basis for reducing the risk of
liability.
2 0 6
Recently, the Department of Justice has stated it will not challenge the
formation of a PPO that would act as an intermediary in negotiating contracts
199. As to the Department of Justice, see Letter from Charles F. Rule, Acting Assistant Att'y
Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice, to Frank Sanchez, at 2 (Oct. 3, 1986) [hereinafter Letter from
Rule to Sanchez]; Letter from Rule to Taylor, supra note 84, at 1. As to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, see FTC REPORT, supra note 45, at 1-2.
200. For a discussion of these guidelines, see supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
201. Letter from Rule to Sanchez, supra note 199, at 2; Letter from Rule to Taylor, supra note
84, at 3.
202. See Letter from Rule to Sanchez, supra note 199, at 2; Letter from Rule to Taylor, supra
note 84, at 2.
203. See Letter from Rule to Sanchez, supra note 199, at 2-3; Letter from Rule to Taylor, supra
note 84, at 3.
204. See McGrath Remarks, supra note 8.
205. McGrath Remarks, supra note 8, at 7-8.
206. Neither the Department of Justice nor the Federal Trade Commission are bound by these
guidelines; generally, however, the guidelines are regarded as official nonbinding opinions. For the
Department of Justice's Antitrust Division Business Review Procedure, see 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1986).
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between providers and third-party payors.20 7 This particular PPO's parent or-
ganization owns several hospitals in the geographic area in which the PPO
would operate.20 8 The PPO would negotiate contracts that would bind the hos-
pital and those physicians participating in the PPO to charge PPO members no
more than the negotiated maximum fee.
20 9
Although this situation is factually similar to Maricopa, the Department of
Justice recognized several distinct differences. First, the PPO would utilize a
unique approach in determining its fee schedule. 2 10 The PPO manager would be
selected by its board of directors, the majority of whom would be members of
the parent corporation. 2 11 The manager would receive input from physicians,
the hospitals, and payors, but would retain ultimate control along with the
board of directors. 2 12 The pricing mechanism would be controlled by members
of the parent corporation hospitals, who are motivated to keep physician fees as
low as possible.21 3 Second, the physician members of the advisory board would
not have access to confidential information on the providers' customary fees or
on the discounts offered to the PPO. 214 Third, the PPO would enroll only a
small fraction of the area's providers. 2 15 Furthermore, there would be no re-
quirement that the physicians contract exclusively with the PPO. 2 16 Fourth, the
PPO would initially contract only with the three hospitals owned by the parent
corporation. 21 7 Finally, the contracts betweenthe PPO and the participating
payors would be nonexclusive, allowing each to contract with other professional
and institutional providers in the geographic area.
2 18
This decision indicates the willingness of the Department of Justice to rec-
ognize that a maximum fee schedule would not necessarily have an anticompeti-
tive effect. It allows a PPO to be structured along the lines of Maricopa but to
avoid the antitrust scrutiny. The Department scrutinized the number of partici-
pating physicians as well as the pricing mechanism. Although this decision pro-
vides welcome relief to health care providers trying to structure their entity, it
does not guarantee protection from action by the FTC or from being found ille-
gal by the judiciary.
The Federal Trade Commission, through private opinion letters, also has
provided insight into the criteria it will use in evaluating the anticompetitive
effects of PPOs. 2 19 In a recent letter to the Commissioner of Insurance for Ne-
207. Letter from Rule to Bush, supra note 84, at 1-2.
208. Letter from Rule to Bush, supra note 84, at 1.
209. Letter from Rule to Bush, supra note 84, at 2.
210. Letter from Rule to Bush, supra note 84, at 4-5.
211. Letter from Rule to Bush, supra note 84, at 3.
212. Letter from Rule to Bush, supra note 84, at 3-4.
213. Letter from Rule to Bush, supra note 84, at 5.
214. Letter from Rule to Bush, supra note 84, at 3-4.
215. Letter from Rule to Bush, supra note 84, at 4.
216. Letter from Rule to Bush, supra note 84, at 4.
217. Letter from Rule to Bush, supra note 84, at 2.
218. Letter from Rule to Bush, supra note 84, at 3.
219. See Letter from Jeffrey.I. Zuckerman, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission,
to David A. Gates 2-3 (Nov. 5, 1986) [hereinafter Letter from Zuckerman to Gates].
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vada, the FTC examined the use of exclusive contracting provisions in Health
Maintanence Organization (HMO) contracts. The letter emphasized the
procompetitive effects of exclusive contracts and briefly discussed their use by
provider-based alternative delivery systems. 220 The FTC recognized the danger
inherent in physician-controlled organizations using exclusive contracts. 221 If a
large percentage of physicians contracted exclusively with one alternative deliv-
ery system, price and service competition among physicians could be reduced.
Exclusive contract agreements used for such purposes will be deemed illegal.
222
Although the FTC's letter is directed toward HMOs, it is directly applicable to
PPOs. Both HMOs and PPOs operate under the basic premise that a limited
panel of providers will provide services to their beneficiaries. Furthermore, the
effect of an exclusive contracting agreement will be the same regardless of
whether it involves an HMO or PPO.
The Department of Justice has similarly stated that anticompetitive effects
could result from restrictions placed on participating physicians' competitive ac-
tivities outside the PPO. 223 The lack of such agreements thus would be a miti-
gating factor for any other anticompetitive effects of the PPO.2 24 Like the FTC,
the Department of Justice did not prohibit the use of exclusive contracts by
provider-based PPOs. Instead, it indicated that provider-based PPOs will be
subject to close scrutiny.
The successful development of a provider-based PPO should be closely pat-
terned upon the guidelines promulgated in Maricopa. It is vital that a provider-
based PPO minimize the possibility that a court would conclude the PPO's fee
arrangement is per se unlawful as illegal price-fixing. Under the per se analysis,
it is generally no defense that a price-fixing arrangement or other anticompeti-
tive agreement neither provides procompetitive benefits nor produces an adverse
220. The FrC's letter discussed extensively the procompetitive effects of exclusive contracts. It
emphasized that exclusive agreements enable an alternative delivery system to provide the services
consumers desire most, thereby allowing the alternative delivery system to be more competitive with
other alternative delivery systems. This strategy also enables the alternative delivery system to have a
closer relationship with its physicians. An alternative delivery system seeking exclusive contract
arrangements with its physicians must demonstrate to them that it will meet their needs and be
successful in attracting beneficiaries. A physician seeking to contract with the alternative delivery
system must demonstrate that she is capable of attracting large numbers of patients and will be able
to retain these patients by providing high-quality, cost-efficient services. Thus, the alternative deliv-
ery system and the physician become mutually dependent. Id. at 2-3.
Additionally, an alternative delivery system with a limited number of physicians exclusively on
its panel may be able to develop an outstanding reputation that will enable it to attract even greater
numbers of beneficiaries. If physicians are affiliated with a great number of alternative delivery
systems, consumers will be unable to distinguish between the systems. When physicians associate
with only one alternative delivery system, consumers will be better able to distinguish among the
available systems. The result will be competition on the basis of price and increased quality. Id.
The FTC letter also discussed the negative aspects of exclusive contracting. These include the
potential for restricting the range of physicians available to patients enrolled in a particular alterna-
tive delivery system, and for allowing one alternative delivery system to prevent another from enter-
ing the market or to drive the other out of the market by depriving it of access to those physicians it
needs to operate efficiently. Id. at 4.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See supra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
224. Letter from Rule to Taylor, supra note 84, at 4.
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effect on prices. Consequently, a PPO should create an independent entity to
establish fees. This entity should be comprised of nonphysicians and should be
charged with collecting the information on which these prices will be based.
Price negotiation is not anticompetitive even though the provider-members
of the PPO otherwise would be competing. Negotiating prices can be an integral
part of a demonstratively procompetitive PPO. Nevertheless, due to the an-
ticompetitive potential of such action it is wise to charge a nonphysician entity,
rather than the providers themselves, with the responsibility of setting fees. By
doing so, any real or perceived anticompetitive intent will be removed, along
with any appearance of impropriety. To do otherwise is to invite increased anti-
trust scrutiny.
Another area of concern is restricting membership on the provider panel.
Any limitation on panel membership should be achieved through objective stan-
dards, based upon legitimate administrative rather than economic reasons. Le-
gitimate limitations can be founded upon the quality of care delivered or the
physical limitations of the PPO. As the PPO's market share increases, it will be
subject to stricter antitrust scrutiny-the greater the market share the PPO pos-
sesses, the greater the benefit of being a member of the PPO, and hence the
greater the potential for reducing competition.
Similarly, restrictions on contracting with other alternative delivery sys-
tems must be made on an objective basis. As noted in the FTC's letter, such
restrictions raise many concerns.225 Courts will evaluate the legitimacy of the
agreement by determining whether it results in a substantial foreclosure of com-
petition in the relevant market. 226 The legality of any such agreement, as deter-
mined under Jefferson Parish, depends on the degree of concentration of the
relevant product and geographic markets, the market shares of the PPO, and the
duration of the agreement. As with restrictive membership on the PPO panel,
exclusive contracting must be justified on noneconomic grounds.
It is imperative to a PPO that it be evaluated under a joint venture/rule of
reason standard rather than the per se standard of Maricopa. Of particular im-
portance are the following questions: What are the functions of the PPO in
relation to third-party payors; how are the PPO pricing and service decisions
made; are greater economic efficiencies achieved; is the management of the PPO
separate and distinct from the individual physicians; is there a shared risk
among the participating physicians; and do the members of the PPO panel com-
pete against each other?
The fundamental determination in choosing the appropriate standard of re-
view is whether the banding together of physicians in a PPO creates a "new
product." In Broadcast Music, the Supreme Court applied the rule of reason in
part because ASCAP marketed a product different from that of its individual
225. Letter from Zuckerman to Gates, supra note 219, at 3; see supra notes 219-22 and accompa-
nying text.
226. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 325-35 (1961); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 297-315 (1948).
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members.227 Sharing the risk of loss and potential for profit of an entity compet-
ing in a market are crucial to a resolution of the "new product" issue. Joint
marketing and other manifestations of integration will distinguish a PPO from
the organization in Maricopa, in which the Court concluded that a new product
had not been offered. 228 Once a court has found that a new product exists or
sufficient joint effort has been undertaken, it will still scrutinize whether the
PPO's price-setting arrangement relates sufficiently to the legitimate purpose
and operation of the entity.
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have stated
that it is appropriate to analyze provider-based PPOs under the principles ap-
plied to joint ventures. 229 Joint ventures by competitors are legal when they
enhance efficiency and promote competition, even though they are actually hori-
zontal agreements among the venturers. To gain antitrust approval, horizontal
agreements must be ancillary to a cooperative activity that promotes competi-
tion, the collective markets of the participating joint venturers must not be so
large that the venture effectively forecloses competition, and the parties must
have no anticompetitive intent.2
30
A provider-based PPO must demonstrate that the horizontal agreements of
its operations, usually physician price-setting and utilization review standards,
are reasonably related and ancillary to the new competitive venture.2 3' Typi-
cally, this requires a showing that the PPO offers economic integration and effi-
ciency advantages that outweigh any anticompetitive harms. Although
providers usually do not share the risk, provider-based PPOs involve some level
of integration to provide efficiencies.
232
The Department of Justice has indicated that the size of a PPO is a relevant
consideration. 233 Membership must not be so inclusive that it prevents the for-
mation of competing PPOs. The Department of Justice will not challenge a
provider-based PPO with fewer than twenty percent of the physicians in the
active market.2 34 As this percentage increases above twenty percent, the De-
partment will apply a market-specific analysis to assess the organization's likely
anticompetitive effects in that market. 235 The Department of Justice will con-
sider, however, the minimum size of the PPO panel needed to compete effi-
ciently in the area, the nature of the PPO, the efficiencies achieved to the extent
participating physicians are willing and able to participate in competing PPOs,
227. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 21-25; see supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
228. The Maricopa Court stated that great consideration will be given to whether a new "prod-
uct" was created, whether there was the pooling of capital or sharing the risk of loss among the
competing participants, and whether price-fixing among the participants was necessary to achieve
the goals of the organization. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 352-56.
229. McGrath Remarks, supra note 8, at 7; FTC REPORT, supra note 45, at 12.
230. FrC REPORT, supra note 45, at 26-27.
231. FTC REPORT, supra note 45, at 7-8.
232. FTC REPORT, supra note 45, at 8.
233. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
234. McGrath Remarks, supra note 8, at 9.
235. McGrath Remarks, supra note 8, at 9.
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and the potential competing alternative delivery systems in the market.236
Finally, the Department of Justice will examine any anticompetitive intent
and any collateral agreements bearing no relationship to the PPO's success that
may discourage competition. 237 This inquiry usually involves reviewing price
agreements, determining the ability of providers to associate with other plans,
and discouraging member physicians and hospitals from granting greater price
concessions to other PPOs. The PPO's agreement with its providers essentially
must be no broader than necessary to protect its own interests.
238
Provider-based PPOs will remain a viable alternative under federal antitrust
policies as long as the organizations are carefully tailored to the aforementioned
criteria. PPOs are not, in and of themselves, anticompetitive unless they are
structured to reduce competition. Those entities that are designed to promote
competition will certainly be welcomed by the federal agencies charged with
enforcing the antitrust laws. At the same time, however, these agencies will
closely examine all provider-based PPOs in light of their potential anticompeti-
tive effect.
VI. CONCLUSION
In recent years, health care providers have come under increased scrutiny
for potential antitrust violations and have lost on many of their traditional de-
fenses. One of the most scrutinized areas is the increasing number of alternative
delivery systems. Of these, PPOs-particuarly provider-based PPOs-have
garnered the most attention. Provider-based PPOs raise a number of concerns
stemming from the potential ability of providers to reduce competition in the
health care industry.
Despite these concerns, provider-based PPOs remain a viable alternative
under the present antitrust laws, provided that they are carefully tailored to the
guidelines set forth by the courts and federal agencies. Specifically, a provider-
based PPO should avoid executing exclusive contracts, obtaining too great a
market share, contracting with too many physicians in a geographic area, and
communicating price information among the member providers. Provider-based
PPOs, while closely regulated, will continue to be a legitimate option to provide
health care, especially in light of the recognition by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and the Department of Justice that PPOs will play an important part in the
future delivery of high-quality, cost-efficient health care in the United States.
236. McGrath Remarks, supra note 8, at 9.
237. McGrath Remarks, supra note 8, at 9.
238. McGrath Remarks, supra note 8, at 10.
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